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Corporate Personhood and Limited
Sovereignty
Elizabeth Pollman *
This Article, written for a symposium celebrating the work of Professor
Margaret Blair, examines how corporate rights jurisprudence helped to shape
the corporate form in the United States during the nineteenth century. It argues
that as the corporate form became popular because of the way it facilitated
capital lock-in, perpetual succession, and provided other favorable
characteristics related to legal personality that separated the corporation from
its participants, the Supreme Court provided crucial reinforcement of these
entity features by recognizing corporations as rights-bearing legal persons
separate from the government. Although the legal personality of corporations is
a distinct concept from their constitutional treatment, the Court’s nineteenthcentury rulings bolstered key features created by corporate law and
simultaneously situated the corporation as subordinate to the state in a system
of federalism. And, finally, the Article suggests that the balance of power struck
in the first century of Supreme Court jurisprudence on corporate rights has been
eroded in the modern era. The Supreme Court’s failure to develop a consistent
approach to corporate rights questions and its tendency to reason based on
views of corporations as associations of persons have exposed a significant flaw
in the Court’s evolving corporate personhood jurisprudence: it lacks a limiting
principle.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1728
I.
KEY CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO LEGAL PERSONALITY FOR
CORPORATIONS .................................................................. 1731
II.
LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY AS A KEY CHARACTERISTIC OF U.S.
CORPORATIONS .................................................................. 1737
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article was written for
the Vanderbilt Law Review symposium on “Professor Margaret Blair’s Contributions to
Understanding the Role of Corporations in the Economy.” Thanks to Margaret Blair for a rich and
inspiring body of work on corporations and the great honor and privilege to collaborate on projects
inquiring into the history and future of corporate personhood and rights. For valuable comments
on this Article, thanks to Evelyn Atkinson, Margaret Blair, Claire Hill, and
symposium participants.

1727

1728

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1727

A.

Separating the Corporation from the Government and
Bolstering Legal Personality for Business
Corporations .......................................................... 1738
B.
Subordinating Competing Corporate Power ......... 1744
III.
THE EXPANSION OF CORPORATE RIGHTS AND THE FORGOTTEN
PATH OF LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY ....................................... 1749
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1753
INTRODUCTION
Corporate personality and personhood comprise a few
conceptually distinct notions or issues. There is the issue of the entity
status of corporations under the law, or what might be called legal
personality. This concept is core to what corporations are and what they
are able to do. It predates the founding of the United States by more
than a century, and, by some measures, has ancient roots. 1 In addition,
there are statutory issues of whether corporations are intended to be
included when a statute refers to “persons,” “people,” or the like.
Statutory laws, both state and federal, have often included corporations
in “definitions” sections, either expressly referring to corporations in
the relevant statutory text or defining the term “person” to include
corporations, to make clear that the statute applies to corporations. 2
Statutes that do not expressly include corporations or define “person”
to include corporations may give rise to ambiguity that must eventually
be interpreted by courts. 3 Further, there is the issue of the treatment of
corporations under the U.S. Constitution.
Each of these three contexts or sets of issues regarding corporate
personality and personhood have engendered significant scholarly
inquiry and debate, particularly the treatment of corporations under
1.
See JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 37–40 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 10th ed. 1875) (discussing the history
of the corporate form); see also Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and
the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1354–74 (2006) (describing antecedents to the
corporate form in the Roman Empire and medieval Italy); Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as
Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 509, 529–32 (2011) (describing the early Roman association
of the “universitas”).
2.
See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals.”).
3.
See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (interpreting whether corporations have
a right of “personal privacy” for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption 7(C));
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (interpreting whether a business
corporation constitutes a “person” who can “exercise religion” under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993).

2021]

CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY

1729

the U.S. Constitution, which does not specifically mention corporations.
As a matter of constitutional text, no explanation is provided regarding
whether a corporation constitutes a “person” or should be counted
among “the people” and in what capacity. 4 Despite the lack of explicit
reference to corporations, the Supreme Court has long recognized that
they can be the subject of constitutional protection or holders of
constitutional rights, and this longstanding notion has become known
as the doctrine of corporate personhood.
The doctrine does not itself establish which rights corporations
hold, or how to determine which rights they should hold. 5 It recognizes
corporations as legal entities that can have a particular constitutional
right or protection—such as a due process right protecting the
corporation from a government taking of corporate property without
compensation. And although the Supreme Court has recognized that
corporations can hold rights, it has never broadly ruled that
corporations are entitled to all of the constitutional rights and
protections that individuals enjoy, coextensive with individual rights
and protections. 6
Scholars, advocates, and other legal observers have long tried to
answer questions of corporate rights, both statutory and constitutional,
by inquiring into the nature of corporations. 7 These inquiries ask
whether corporations are the kinds of entities, or legal persons, that can
or should have rights. 8 Answers have often focused on notions of
corporations as artificial persons created by the state with only the
powers and rights so conceded, aggregations of persons, or real entities
capable of exercising rights separate and apart from those of their
members. 9

4.
See, e.g., ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 10–15 (2010) (noting the absence of textual reference or explanation of
the treatment of corporations in the Constitution).
5.
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1675.
6.
See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2015) (tracing “the two-hundred-year
history of corporate rights jurisprudence to show that the Supreme Court has long accorded rights
to corporations based on the rationale that corporations represent associations of people from
whom such rights are derived”).
7.
See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism About Corporate Rights, in
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 346 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë
Robinson eds., 2016) (describing longstanding debate “about the ontology of corporations,
nonprofits, churches, and associations” and “their status as moral and legal rights-holders”).
8.
Id. at 345.
9.
See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 785, 799–808; William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1989); Ron Harris, The Transplantation of
the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to British
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This Article takes a different approach to the subject. Instead of
asking what the nature of the corporation tells us about the rights that
corporations should have, it examines how corporate rights
jurisprudence shaped the corporate form itself in the United States
during the nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court began to
address these matters of constitutional interpretation. 10
Specifically, this Article argues that as the corporate form
became popular in the United States in the nineteenth century because
of the way it facilitated capital lock-in and provided other favorable
characteristics related to legal personality that separated the
corporation from its participants, the Supreme Court provided crucial
reinforcement of these entity features by recognizing corporations as
rights-bearing legal persons separate from the government. The Court’s
nineteenth-century rulings provided access to federal courts and
protected contract and property rights against the government,
bolstering the utility of the corporate form in the United States during
a critical time in its history and development. Although the legal
personality of corporations is a separate and distinct concept from their
constitutional treatment, the latter issue presented opportunities to
strengthen the key characteristics associated with legal personality for
U.S. business corporations.
Furthermore, the Court’s nineteenth-century rulings not only
granted rights to corporations that solidified the utility of the legal
entity created by the corporate charter—they also established a
hierarchy that subordinated corporations to the state. Corporations
have a limited form of sovereignty in the sense of authority and
autonomy—they have, to a degree, discretion over their internal
governance and protectible interests in their property. The Supreme
Court gave its imprimatur to this understanding during a key period
for the development and spread of business corporations in the United
States. But this measure of sovereignty was tightly limited and
derivative of the state. In the first century of Supreme Court
jurisprudence on corporate rights, the Court consistently denied
corporations status as “citizens,” recognized that states granted limited
concessions to them and could retain control over them, and rejected
Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1423–24 (2006);
Pollman, supra note 5, at 1630.
10. This inquiry is an extension or twist on the question that Margaret Blair and I asked in
work that explored how the Supreme Court understood the nature and function of corporations in
the economy and society as it was deciding key early cases on the constitutional rights of
corporations. See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View of Corporate
Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 245 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017); see also Blair & Pollman,
supra note 6, at 1678.
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the notion of business corporations having liberty rights. This Article
thus explores the contribution of corporate rights jurisprudence to the
utility of the corporate form, bolstering the key features created by
corporate law and simultaneously situating the corporation as
subordinate to the state in a system of federalism.
And, finally, the discussion also suggests that the balance of
power struck in the first century of Supreme Court jurisprudence on
corporate rights has been eroded in the modern era. Whereas
nineteenth-century case law denied rights to corporations that were not
closely aligned with carrying out the key functions related to legal
personality, subsequent case law has dramatically expanded expressive
rights to a broad spectrum of corporations, including large
multinationals that rival governments in power. Business corporations
remain structurally subordinate to the state yet have increased their
ability to influence and opt out of laws. The Supreme Court’s failure to
develop a consistent approach to corporate rights questions and its
tendency to reason based on views of corporations as associations of
persons have exposed a significant flaw in the Supreme Court’s evolving
corporate personhood jurisprudence: it lacks a limiting principle.
This Article, written for the Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium
celebrating the work of Professor Margaret Blair, proceeds as follows.
Part I summarizes the literature on the characteristics of the modern
business corporation, highlighting the important work of Professor
Blair, which provides a framework for understanding the history and
key functions of legal personality for corporations. Part II argues that
nineteenth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence on corporate rights
bolstered these key functions or characteristics and contributed to the
utility of the corporate form in the United States. Part III explores how
the dramatic expansion of corporate rights in the past half century
has revealed the lack of a limiting principle to the doctrine of
corporate personhood.
I. KEY CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO LEGAL PERSONALITY FOR
CORPORATIONS
The entity status of corporations under the law—legal
personality—was established long before the question arose as to how
to treat corporations under the U.S. Constitution. This Part begins by
examining the historical roots of legal personality, and specifically the
key functions or characteristics of business corporations that developed
by and during the nineteenth century, to lay the foundation for then
turning to an examination of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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To start, when a corporate charter is granted, “the law
immediately recognizes the existence of a new legal entity that is
separate from the organizers and investors, an entity that can carry out
certain business activities as a ‘person.’ ” 11 The separate legal
personality of a “corpus,” or corporate body, evolved in Europe out of
laws and practices for municipalities, religious institutions, charitable
organizations, and ecclesiastical bodies, such as during the Middle Ages
concerning churches and universities. 12 During this early period, legal
status as a corporation generally required a charter from the King
or Parliament. 13
By at least as early as the eighteenth century, English law had
established corporations as having certain abilities to act as an entity
under the law. Blackstone noted that when members “are consolidated
and united into a corporation, they and their successors are then
considered as one person in law.” 14 And, “as one person, they have one
will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the
individuals . . . for all the individual members that have existed from
the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist,
are but one person in law, a person that never dies.” 15
In concrete terms, the characteristics or abilities that flowed
from legal personality at common law included the ability to contract,
to own property, and to sue and be sued in the corporate name. 16 And,
as Blackstone noted, it also included a conception of the corporation as
11. Blair, supra note 9, at 786.
12. Id. at 788–89; RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 16–17 (2000) (explaining that by the sixteenth century,
corporations were used for “the King himself, cities and boroughs, guilds, universities and colleges,
hospitals and other charitables, bishops, deans and chapters, abbots and convents, and other
ecclesiastical bodies”).
13. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 4 (1993) (noting that seventeenth-century jurists
described the corporation as “a legal unit with its own legal rights and responsibilities” that “was
a creation of the law and could achieve legal status only by act of the king or Parliament”).
14. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *468.
15. Id. In 1612, Lord Coke noted a corporation was “invisible, immortal, and rest[ed] only in
intendment and consideration of the law.” Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973;
10 Co. Rep. 23 a, 32 b.
16. The corporate ability to own property and to sue and be sued were considered incident to
the corporate form at common law. See, e.g., Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573, 584
(1865) (referencing as established law that “[t]he corporation is the legal owner of all of the
property . . . and . . . can deal with the corporate property as absolutely as a private individual can
deal with his own”); 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 13 (London, J.
Butterworth 1793) (describing a corporation as “vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity
of acting, in several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of
contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued”); 9 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4226 (West 2020) (“The power to sue and be sued is
one of the inherent powers of a corporation and is among the incidental or implied powers that
have been attributed to corporations from the earliest period.”).
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potentially having a perpetual existence, or at least an existence that
was not tied to the lifespan of its participants, in contrast to the
partnership form of business. 17 Limited liability for corporate
shareholders subsequently developed over time. 18
These entity characteristics or abilities of the corporation were
crucial to establishing the usefulness of the corporate form for raising
capital from a broad group of investors and building lasting institutions.
Recognizing the importance of understanding the nature of the
corporation and its core features, corporate law theorists have identified
and debated lists of “essential” characteristics or functions. 19 One of the
most notable treatments is Professor Margaret Blair’s identification of
four key functions of legal personality for corporations:
1. providing continuity and a clear line of succession in property
and contract,
2. providing an “identifiable persona” to serve as a central actor in
carrying out the business activity,
3. providing a mechanism for separating pools of assets belonging
to the corporation from those belonging to the individuals
participating in the enterprise, and

17. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 407–10 (2003) (explaining how a
partnership, as compared to a corporation, could be terminated by any partner “at any time and
for any reason” and would be automatically dissolved upon a partner’s death, bankruptcy, or loss
of mental capacity); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the Limits on
Contractual Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture, in CONSTRUCTING
CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 29, 34 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia
eds., 2004).
18. See Lamoreaux, supra note 17, at 32; ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 7 (1986);
BLUMBERG, supra note 13, at 3–20. For a discussion of how “corporate separateness” is not absolute
and “the actual insulation between the legal sphere of the company and that of shareholders can
take different forms and serve distinct functions,” see Mariana Pargendler, The Fallacy of
Complete Corporate Separateness, in HIDDEN FALLACIES IN CORPORATE LAW AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (Alexandra Andhov & Saule Omarova eds.) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author).
19. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 253–54
(describing debate about the essential characteristics of the business corporation); see also CLARK,
supra note 18, at 2 (identifying limited liability, centralized management, perpetual life, and
transferability of shares as key features of the corporate form); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393–98, 432–38 (2000)
(identifying the essential functions of organizational law as asset partitioning, facilitating
contracting, and establishing transferability of ownership and withdrawal rights); John Armour,
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, The Foundations of Corporate Law
§ 1.2 (John M. Olin Ctr. for L. Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 902, 2017)
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Kraakman_902.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DE94-9AT9] (identifying legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares,
delegated management with a board structure, and investor ownership as the “five core structural
characteristics of the business corporation”).
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4. providing a framework for self-governance of certain business or
commercial activity. 20
The first key function concerns the creation of a separate legal
person for contract and property purposes. This practice dates back to
early religious institutions that were granted charters with the ability
to contract and hold property in their own names, which “ensured that
the property would not be handed down to heirs of individual persons
who controlled and managed the property on behalf of the institutions
(such as bishops or abbots).” 21 Further, this avoided the possibility that
“the property [would] revert to the estate of the lord or be heavily taxed
when those controlling persons died or were replaced.” 22 This function
was closely tied to the notion of perpetual existence, allowing a group of
people to act together over time and for changes in membership to occur
without disturbing the corporate property. 23
The idea was subsequently applied to a wide range of
institutions, including business or commercial organizations by the
seventeenth century, although charters for these purposes were
relatively rare. 24 When a single individual such as the King or a bishop
operated through the corporate form, this was referred to as a
“corporation sole,” conveying that the human individual was separate
from the official office and that the property they controlled did not
belong to them personally. 25 By contrast, any other institution using the
corporate form was referred to as a “corporation aggregate,” in
recognition that the separate legal personality was created from a group
of people. 26
The second key function is that the corporate form facilitates the
creation of an “identifiable persona” that serves as “a central actor.” 27
This point closely follows from the first—that is, the corporation not
only has the ability to contract and hold property in its own name, but
its very existence as a separate legal person allows it to serve as the
counterparty to “all contracts that the corporation enters into with its
various participants (managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and
investors), and that it can sue and be sued in its own name, and that it
can do things and take on characteristics that distinguish it from any
20. Blair, supra note 9, at 787–88. Professor Blair refers to these as functions of “corporate
personhood.” Id. at 796–97.
21. Id. at 789.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 789–90.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 790.
27. Id. at 787.
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of its participants.” 28 Put differently, legal personality serves the
function of establishing a separation between the entity and its
participants and the capacity for the entity to act in its own name.
Professor Blair developed this concept with the term “identifiable
persona” and described the importance of this function for developing
intangible assets such as goodwill, reputation, and brand. 29 Other
scholars have used other terms such as a “nexus of imputation” and
“nexus for regulation” and have explored the corporation as a distinct
nexus for imputing both legal rights and detriments and for creating
separate “legal spheres.” 30
The third key function in Professor Blair’s articulation is the
separation of assets belonging to the corporation from those of the
individual participants. The separate legal existence of the corporation
allows equity investors to commit assets to the enterprise that neither
they, nor their creditors, can unilaterally withdraw. Whereas partners
in an at-will partnership have, by default, the ability to withdraw and
force the dissolution and liquidation of the business, shareholders do
not have such right. 31 Their capital, once invested, becomes the
property of the corporation, and shareholders hold transferable shares
in the corporation. 32
Scholars have used a variety of terms to refer to this function,
such as “lock-in” 33 and “asset partitioning,” 34 and have traced the
various ways in which the legal personality of the corporation
establishes a separate pool of corporate assets, thereby helping the
corporation to draw in firm-specific assets and resources for long-term
success as well as bond the corporation’s contract commitments as
credible. 35 Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have
distinguished “affirmative” and “defensive” asset partitioning. The
28. Id. at 797.
29. Id. at 798.
30. See HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A TRANSLATION
OF THE FIRST EDITION OF THE REINE RECHTSLEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW 50 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1997) (describing this function as establishing
not only a corporate nexus for contractual relationships with private parties but also as a nexus
for the imputation of regulation by the state); Mariana Pargendler, Veil Peeking: The Corporation
as a Nexus for Regulation, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 717, 720 (2021) (arguing the corporate form provides
for regulatory partitioning and a separation of “legal spheres”).
31. Stout, supra note 19, at 255; see also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(1) (amended 2020)
(providing that notice of a partner’s express will to withdraw is an event causing dissolution).
32. Armour et al., supra note 19, § 1.2.3 (describing transferable shares as a basic
characteristic of the business corporation and noting “transferability permits the firm to conduct
business uninterruptedly as the identity of its owners changes”).
33. Blair, supra note 17, at 388.
34. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 393.
35. Id. at 393–95; Blair, supra note 17, at 390–94; Armour et al., supra note 19, § 1.2.1 &
n.13.
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former term refers to the establishment of priority for corporate
creditors and liquidation protection of corporate assets, and the latter
term refers to the shielding of shareholders’ personal assets from the
creditors of the corporation, often referred to as limited liability. 36
The fourth key function that Professor Blair identifies is
providing a framework for self-governance. The creation of a separate
corporate entity necessitates some mechanism for decisionmaking to
determine who can take actions on the corporation’s behalf and how the
corporation is to be operated. 37 This structure can vary widely between
different types of organizations that use the corporate form—the
fundamental point is that the grant of legal personality necessitates
and provides for some measure of self-governance. This concept is
centuries old—for example, some municipal corporation charters dating
back to the Middle Ages explicitly provided for self-governance. 38
Similarly, the famous seventeenth-century trading companies of
England and the Netherlands were chartered to “create a separate
entity that could administer the monopoly rights granted over the spice
trade on behalf of a group of merchants.” 39 The Dutch East India
Company, for instance, was originally organized as a combination of
smaller spice trading merchants who formed a “Council of Seventeen”
with representatives from different regions and served as a governing
board. 40 Its letters patent granted the company the ability to establish
and enforce its own governance rules and the power to engage in war
with other nations and other state-like functions. 41 And, at least since
the early nineteenth century, corporate law has prescribed a standard
governance structure for business corporations: “a managerial
hierarchy topped by a board of directors that is distinct from

36. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 393–94 (explaining that asset partitioning
results in the “assignment to creditors of priorities in the distinct pools of assets that result from
the formation of a legal entity”).
37. Blair, supra note 9, at 788.
38. Id. at 790; see also Elizabeth Pollman, The History and Revival of the Corporate Purpose
Clause, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1423, 1428 (2021). For a historical account of the origin of the board of
directors as a corporate governance structure, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and
Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89 (2004).
39. Blair, supra note 9, at 791.
40. STEPHEN R. BOWN, MERCHANT KINGS: WHEN COMPANIES RULED THE WORLD, 1600–1900,
at 27 (2009).
41. The Dutch East India Company, also known as the “VOC,” was “a private commercial
corporation operating free from the direct control of the government of the United Netherlands,
yet it [had] the authority to make decisions in the name of that government.” BOWN, supra note
40, at 28 (“The VOC could make treaties and declare war or peace in the name of the States
General . . . establish colonies, dispense justice and enact laws, even issue its own
currency . . . . The VOC would essentially operate as a state within a state.”).
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shareholders, managers, and employees, and that has fiduciary duties
to the corporation itself as well as to shareholders.” 42
II. LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY AS A KEY CHARACTERISTIC OF U.S.
CORPORATIONS
Just as the common law was recognizing these key functions of
legal personality in the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
was asked to rule on the treatment of corporations under the U.S.
Constitution. The path that the Court would take in these early cases
was far from clear—the Constitution includes no specific reference to
corporations. 43
This Part argues that the Court made two key moves in deciding
these nineteenth-century cases that have had an enduring impact on
the corporate form and its utility for U.S. business corporations. First,
the Supreme Court bolstered the entity status of the corporation as
separate not only from its participants, but also from the government. 44
Although in hindsight this point may be taken as given, the Court’s
rulings were novel at the time and developing on an ad hoc basis while
its view of corporations was still in flux, corporations were primarily
used for quasi-public purposes, and corporate law was on the cusp of a
series of innovations. 45 Corporate law literature does not typically
identify the separation and protection of the corporation from the

42. Blair, supra note 9, at 788.
43. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 4 (1970). A small number of corporations existed and played a
role in the American colonial period. Id. at 7, 14; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 188–89 (2d ed. 1985).
44. In earlier work, I observed but did not fully develop this point. See Pollman, supra note
5, at 1639:
[E]arly corporate personhood cases are . . . akin to the concept of legal personality
insofar as the constitutional jurisprudence bolstered the corporation as a separate
entity from its shareholders and protected the property interests of the shareholders in
the corporate property. Recognizing the corporate charter as covered by the Contract
Clause and the corporation’s property as protected by the Due Process Clause stabilized
the corporate form as a viable organization for long-term private investment.
45. See HURST, supra note 43, at 17 (describing corporations organized with a quasi-public
function); Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L.
REV. 105, 110 (1888) (“But the corporation was far from being regarded as simply an organization
for the more convenient prosecution of business. It was looked on as a public agency . . . .”); Robert
B. Thompson, Why New Corporate Law Arises: Implications for the Twenty-First Century, in THE
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 3 (Steven Davidoff Solomon
& Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (discussing nineteenth-century innovations in corporate law
including limited liability, general incorporation statutes, and a shift to director-centric corporate
governance).

1738

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1727

government as a function of legal personality 46—and yet without this
development, the utility of the corporate form for pursuing large-scale
profitmaking purposes would be in doubt. The source of law for this
point is constitutional rather than corporate; the function is closely
connected to the concepts of capital lock-in and constructing an
identifiable persona discussed in Part I.
Second, in granting rights, the Supreme Court recognized and
protected corporations, but it simultaneously subordinated them to the
state—thus treating the corporation as a limited and derivative
sovereign at best. The extension of corporate rights was paradoxically
an opportunity to constrain corporations and their competing claims to
authority during a period in which sovereignty was “diffuse” and
increasingly becoming “concentrated in the hands of only two legitimate
sovereigns”—federal and state governments. 47 The Court’s early
distinction of municipal corporations from other corporations put the
former on a path of particularly diminished power, 48 but, as this Part
shows, the potential for other types of corporations to serve as rival
powers to the state was also curbed during the nineteenth century. 49
A. Separating the Corporation from the Government and Bolstering
Legal Personality for Business Corporations
The very first Supreme Court case on the constitutional rights
of corporations, in 1809, involved federalism battles faced by the Bank
of the United States, the institution famously championed by Alexander
Hamilton and created by Congress, and its desire to access federal
courts to adjudicate them. 50 The Bank refused to pay a tax that populist
state lawmakers levied on a bank branch in Savannah, Georgia. The
bank headquarters in Philadelphia instructed the Savannah branch to

46. Some discussions treat the corporation as a “nexus for imputation” or “nexus for
regulation,” supra note 30, with a focus on the entity as a locus for government imposition of laws
and regulations.
47. See Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J.
1792, 1796 (2019) (describing the post-Revolution period as having “power rested with a complex
patchwork of local institutions with independent authority” and noting that through the 1780s,
state legislatures “sought to wield [their] newfound sovereignty against the competing claimants
to authority within state borders—corporations, local institutions, Native nations, separatist
movements”).
48. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1060–62 (1980)
(describing the “powerlessness” of American cities and their legal status as subject “to absolute
state control”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Rethinking Municipal Corporate Rights, 61 B.C. L. REV. 591,
604–13 (2020) (discussing municipal corporation rights).
49. For a history of corporations, local institutions, Native nations, and separatist movements
as “competing claimants to authority within state borders” see Ablavsky, supra note 47.
50. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
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refuse to comply with the state tax, hoping to “bring the question before
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 51 Subsequently, a Georgia tax
collector, “with ‘force and arms,’ ” entered the Savannah branch and
took two boxes of silver coins. 52 The case made its way to the Supreme
Court on the threshold issue of whether the corporation could sue or be
sued in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, together with the Judiciary Act
of 1789, provides that the federal judiciary may hear “cases” or
“controversies” between “citizens” of different states. 53
The Court observed that the “mere legal entity, a corporation
aggregate is certainly not a citizen,” but it was willing to look to English
common law precedent for the notion of looking to the “members”
composing the corporations and to extend this principle for purposes of
determining whether complete diversity of state citizenship existed. 54
There was, of course, no obligation on the Supreme Court to look to
existing English common law on this issue, and as historian James
Willard Hurst has pointed out, “we built public policy toward the
corporation almost wholly out of our own wants and concerns, shaped
primarily by our own institutions.” 55 The case illustrates how the Court
was willing to interpret the Constitution to strengthen the existing
common law right to sue and be sued in the corporate name and bolster
this function by extending a pathway to federal courts, yet did so in
language that did not recognize corporations as “citizens.” The latter
point was likely the subject of careful consideration, as the case
portended larger challenges ahead in chartering battles and debates
about the effect of corporations on the balance of power in a relatively
new system of federalism.
Following Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, the next early
cases concerning corporate constitutional rights involved rights
associated with contract and property interests. They spanned a time
from when corporations served a quasi-public function to the start of

51. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 41 (2018) (quoting W. Calvin Smith, Banks, Law,
and Politics: The Origins, Outcome and Significance of the Deveaux Case, in THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 9, 11 (Peter Becker ed., 1991)).
52. Id.
53. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87–88.
54. Id. at 86–87. The Court later changed its approach to diversity jurisdiction but continued
to allow diversity jurisdiction for corporations. See, e.g., Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S.
497 (1844).
55. HURST, supra note 43, at xxiv. Due to the Bubble Act in England, from about 1780, the
United States developed dramatically more experience with using the corporate form for business.
Id. (“For 100 years, we proceeded to use the corporate instrument on a scale unmatched in
England.”).
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the transformation to the modern business corporation. 56 These cases
coincided with incremental changes occurring in corporate law over the
nineteenth century as various states evolved from a system of special
legislative chartering of each corporation to general incorporation laws,
adopted limited liability for shareholders, and generalized use of
centralized management. 57
In the 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
the Supreme Court recognized that corporations were protected by the
Contract Clause of the Constitution, which forbids a state from
impairing existing contractual obligations. 58 The Court reasoned that
the corporate charter represented a contract between the individuals
who incorporated the entity and the state, and therefore the state could
not unilaterally amend the charter of a private college and effectively
convert it into a public institution. 59 In the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, the charter of Dartmouth College, granted in 1769, “is a
contract for the security and disposition of property. It is a contract, on
the faith of which, real and personal estate has been conveyed to the
corporation. It is, then, a contract within the letter of the
constitution . . . .” 60 For Contract Clause purposes, this recognized the
corporation as a contract creating a separate entity through which
people carried on business or their identified objectives, and it protected
the interests of individuals who had contributed to the entity. 61
The protection afforded by the decision resembles the function of
capital lock-in or asset partitioning insofar as it shields the corporate
assets—the difference is that it protects them from government
interference, rather than from private parties such as shareholders or

56. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 6, at 1697–1706; Thompson, supra note 45, at 4.
57. Thompson, supra note 45, at 4–8.
58. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650 (1819).
59. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 650.
60. Id. at 644.
61. See Charles R. T. O’Kelley, What Was the Dartmouth College Case Really About?, 74
VAND. L. REV. 1645, 1722 (2021):
Marshall saw . . . that Dartmouth College as an institution never would have existed but
for the entrepreneurial efforts of Eleazar Wheelock, and that the institution that had
evolved over time was a result of the contractual bargain made by Wheelock and John
Wentworth, acting as agent of King George III;
see also Margaret M. Blair, How Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward Clarified Corporate
Law 3 (Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 21-19, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3830603
[https://perma.cc/GDZ6-K6SS]
(arguing that Dartmouth College “strengthened the power of corporate charters granted to
organizers by recognizing the charter as a contract not only among the private citizens organizing
the firm, but between the organizers and the state”).
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their creditors. 62 And like capital lock-in or asset partitioning,
constitutional protection under the Contract Clause added to the
stability of the business enterprise by enabling the corporation to make
credible commitments and helping to ensure that firm-specific
investments would be protected.
Furthermore, the Dartmouth College decision reflects respect for
a sphere of self-governance for the institution that was beyond ex post
governmental interference. As Hurst explained, “[the] decision
extended the protection of the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution not only over a donor’s gift and the college’s existing assets
but also over the frame of organization and powers of the institution as
created by the original charter, as against later intruding legislation.” 63
This separation of the corporation from the government is, I argue,
another key aspect of legal personality for U.S. business corporations—
the source of the law has simply been federal and constitutional in
contrast to state and corporate.
Yet the degree to which the grant of the corporate charter
accords any sovereignty for the corporation from the government was
tightly limited and derivative from the state. In the wake of Dartmouth
College, following a suggestion in Justice Joseph Story’s concurrence,
most states passed general incorporation statutes that reserved the
power to change the terms of corporate charters after they had been
issued. 64 As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, during the
mid-nineteenth century, “the general reservation clause or statute,
giving the state the power to amend corporate charters, became the
principal mechanism by which states hedged on commitments to
business corporations.” 65 At the same time that states adapted their
statutes to maintain control in this way, they also facilitated
widespread adoption of the corporate form. A special charter from the
state legislature was no longer required to incorporate, and
62. Cf. Blair, supra note 17, at 454 (“[The ability to lock in capital] grew out of the fact that
a corporate charter created a separate legal entity, whose existence and governance were separate
from any of its participants.”).
63. HURST, supra note 43, at 4–5; see also Alyssa Penick, From Disestablishment to
Dartmouth College v. Woodward: How Virginia’s Fight over Religious Freedom Shaped the History
of American Corporations, 39 LAW & HIST. REV. 479, 484 (2021) (observing that a pre-Dartmouth
College decision from Virginia’s highest court “offered a glimpse of an alternate legal landscape
where American corporations existed as fundamentally communal institutions at the discretion of
the legislature and charters were negotiable and revocable”).
64. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 675 (Story, J., concurring) (“Unless a power be reserved for this
purpose, the crown cannot, in virtue of its prerogative, without the consent of the corporation, alter
or amend the charter . . . .”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1605, 1616 (1988) (discussing Dartmouth College and reservation
clauses).
65. Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at 1616.
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corporations could be formed for a wide variety of purposes, including
the manufacturing that spurred the Industrial Revolution. 66 The
number of corporations increased significantly as states began to
provide general access and liberalize their corporate laws. 67
It was also in the nineteenth century that the Supreme Court
established constitutional protection for corporate property. 68 Most
famously, in 1886, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad, 69 Chief Justice Waite stated from the bench before argument:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We
are all of opinion that it does. 70

This pronouncement responded to the defendant railroad’s brief, which
argued that a provision of the California constitution violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by excluding corporations from a certain
property tax deduction, thereby imposing “unequal burdens” on
corporations and denying them “equal protection of the laws.” 71 The
defendant’s argument focused on property rights: “The truth cannot be
evaded that, for the purpose of protecting rights, the property of all
business and trading corporations IS the property of the individual
corporators.” 72 The Court’s opinion was based on a more narrow
ground—that the state board lacked jurisdiction to assess the value of
the railroad fences—and expressly stated that “it [wa]s not necessary
to consider any other questions raised by the pleadings and the facts
found by the court.” 73

66. HURST, supra note 43, at 18; David F. Linowes, The Corporation as Citizen, in THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 345, 346 (A.E. Dick Howard
ed., 1992); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 73 (1992).
67. Whereas by 1800 there were about 300 corporations, mostly vested with a public or quasipublic purpose, by the turn of the twentieth century, there were approximately 500,000 business
corporations. Blair, supra note 17, at 389 n.3; HURST, supra note 43, at 17.
68. See Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1460–63 (1987); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 64, at
1641 (describing the doctrine of corporate personhood as “the Supreme Court’s solution to two
problems” as it “guarantee[d] that the owners of property held in the name of a corporation would
receive the same constitutional protections as the owners of property held in their own name” and
“determin[ed] how to assign the power to assert constitutional rights in corporately held
property”).
69. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
70. Id. at 396.
71. Id. at 409.
72. HORWITZ, supra note 66, at 70 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Argument for Defendant, San
Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885)).
73. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 416.
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As the Court avoided the constitutional question in the Santa
Clara opinion, it did not explain the basis for its pre-argument
statement that corporations are persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Not long after, however, the Court stated in
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania:
Under the designation of ‘person’ [under the Fourteenth Amendment] there is no doubt
that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely associations of
individuals united for a special purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular
name, and have a succession of members without dissolution. 75

Further, in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith,
the Court cited Santa Clara and Pembina Mining in holding that
corporations could invoke Fourteenth Amendment due process
protections. 76 The Court reiterated that “corporations are persons
within the meaning of the [Fourteenth Amendment]” and explained,
“corporations can invoke the benefits of provisions of the Constitution
and laws which guaranty to persons the enjoyment of property, or afford
to them means for its protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously
affecting it.” 77 The Court also extended Fifth Amendment due process
protection to corporate property in a case in which an act of the
secretary of the interior would have revoked and annulled a grant of
public lands to a railroad corporation. 78 By this time, these
constitutional protections for property were no small matter—
corporations were estimated to control four-fifths of the wealth of the
United States by 1890, 79 and popular discourse reflected rising concern
about the wealth and power of corporations in society. 80

74. For a discussion of the Santa Clara case and the debate surrounding its unusual
circumstances, including a conspiracy theory that arose and was discounted, see Pollman, supra
note 5, at 1642–44 nn.79–92 and accompanying text.
75. 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888). Like Santa Clara, the case concerned the assessment of a tax
against a corporation. For a more recent case recognizing a corporate equal protection right under
the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of a discriminatory state tax, see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
76. 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
77. Id.
78. Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893) (“A revocation of the
approval of the secretary of the interior, however, by his successor in office was an attempt to
deprive the plaintiff [railroad corporation] of its property without due process of law, and was,
therefore, void.”); see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that regulation
of a coal corporation’s mining activity under a state statute could be so pervasive as to constitute
a taking); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (allowing a foreign
corporation to claim a takings violation).
79. Blair, supra note 9, at 809 (citing 1 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, at v–xi (1896)).
80. Evelyn Atkinson, Frankenstein’s Baby: The Forgotten History of Corporations, Race, and
Equal Protection, 108 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 32–33) (on file with author).
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In sum, in the nineteenth century, the Court enabled
corporations to access federal courts through diversity jurisdiction and
recognized corporations as having the protection of the Contract Clause,
as well as the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments in the context of
protecting corporate property. 81 These constitutional rulings played an
underappreciated role in bolstering the key functions of legal
personality created by corporate law.
B. Subordinating Competing Corporate Power
The historical background on corporations in which the
nineteenth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence arose is more
complex than often acknowledged, and it helps to shed light on another
important aspect of what the Court achieved through its rulings.
According to some accounts, in the early nineteenth century,
corporations were seen as “agencies of government . . . for the
furtherance of community purposes.” 82 In exchange for the privilege of
incorporation and some measure of profit, the corporation was also
expected to serve public need. As one treatise explained, “a state would
have accomplished but little in the way of banking and insurance, and
in turnpike and railroads, had not the absence of great capitalists been
remedied by corporate associations, which aggregate the resources of
many persons.” 83 In some regard, these new corporations serving quasipublic purposes were “the states’ servants.” 84
Yet, as legal historian Greg Ablavsky explains: “[E]arly
American law afforded corporations many of the attributes of
sovereignty. Authorized to craft and enforce their own legal orders,
corporations looked and acted a lot like states.” 85 Indeed, many states
had evolved from chartered colonies, and the “governance technology”
of a written charter was used for what we would now consider both
public and private uses. 86 The “company-states” of the late eighteenth
81. Linowes, supra note 66, at 346–47.
82. Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY
Q. 51, 55 (1993); see also ANGELL & AMES, supra note 1, at 7–8:
The object in creating a corporation is . . . to gain the union, contribution and assistance
of several persons for the successful promotion of some design of general
utility . . . [and] the corporation may, at the same time be established for the advantage
of those who are members of it.
83. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 48 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1871).
84. Ablavsky, supra note 47, at 1816.
85. Id. at 1817.
86. See David Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation? The Corporate Origins of
Modern Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 419 (2017) (“The corporation and the
modern constitutional state embody a common governance technology—a technology that began
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century such as the British East India Company, which claimed
sovereignty over vast territories, were commonly known. 87 The fact that
charters, granted by a sovereign, were used for both trading and
political or governmental purposes “itself heightened the notion that
incorporation had a peculiarly close tie to the sovereign.” 88 And, in the
late eighteenth century, it was not clearly settled whether corporate
authority, once granted pursuant to a written charter from a sovereign,
was subject to state legislative control. 89 As such, “[t]o many in the early
United States, then, corporations looked less like creatures of the states
than rivals for their power.” 90
Put into this context, another important aspect of what the
Supreme Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence achieved during the
nineteenth century, therefore, was a reordering or clarification that
constrained corporations and their competing claims to authority as
rivals to the state. The Court granted rights that enabled corporations
to benefit from their key features of legal personality while at the same
time bringing clarity to the hierarchy of institutions—corporations were
separate from, and subject to, state authority, and not citizens from
whom power derived. And, particularly compared to the hundred years
that followed, it is remarkable the extent to which the Court rejected
claims of corporate citizenship and power while at the same time
strengthening the corporate form.
This project began in the Court’s first decision interpreting the
status of corporations under the Constitution in Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux. 91 As discussed above, the Court rejected the notion
that the corporation itself could be deemed a “citizen”—it was plainly
inapt in the eyes of the Court, which recognized that incorporating
forms a separate legal personality. 92 It nonetheless found a way to apply
diversity jurisdiction to corporations, which were understood to have
common law rights to sue and be sued. And the Court notably persisted
with the corporation and passed over to the state, and the heart of which is the delegation of
authority by written charter.”); Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 1397, 1407, 1481–84, 1503 (2019) (describing states that evolved from chartered colonies
and examining U.S. history on corporate and government use of written charters).
87. Ablavsky, supra note 47, at 1817.
88. HURST, supra note 43, at 2.
89. See Ablavsky, supra note 47, at 1818; GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY:
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 185–204 (1997)
(discussing the “vested rights” debate).
90. Ablavsky, supra note 47, at 1818.
91. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
92. Id. at 86 (“That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a
corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the
courts of the United States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in
their corporate name.”).
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over the nineteenth century in rejecting corporate claims to citizenship.
For example, in the 1839 case Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the Supreme
Court ruled that corporations are not “citizens” for the purposes of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. 93 The Court reasoned
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause never intended to give
citizens privileges and at the same time exempt them from liabilities,
as would occur if corporations, with limited liability, enjoyed citizen
status. 94 And the Court reaffirmed this ruling as corporations raised
the issue over time. 95
Dartmouth College perhaps did the most work to conceptually
separate corporations from the state and reinforce their property and
contract rights—but also highlighted the path for states to retain their
power over them. One of the most lasting impacts of the decision was
the reservation of power in general incorporation statutes suggested in
Justice Story’s concurrence. 96
And, after Dartmouth College, the Court further constrained
corporations with strict readings of corporate charters and analysis that
balanced a corporation’s interests against that of the public. Against the
backdrop of public controversy over special franchises, particularly
concerning banks, railroads, and insurance companies, as well as
infrastructure such as bridges and turnpikes, the Court explicitly
confronted balance-of-power issues. In 1837, in the Charles River
Bridge case, the Court strictly construed a corporate charter against the
grantees in favor of preserving public rights. 97 The Court rejected the
notion that the charter granted an implied monopoly on the basis that
the overriding concern was to instead protect “the power of the several
states, in relation to the corporations they have chartered,” for the
issues were “pregnant with important consequences; not only to the
individuals who are concerned in the corporate franchises, but to the
communities in which they exist.” 98 The Court observed: “While the
rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget, that

93. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586–87 (1839).
94. Id. at 586.
95. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining &
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888).
96. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819) (Story, J.,
concurring); see Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830) (upholding reservation
of state legislature’s right to alter a corporate charter).
97. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 536, 546–48 (1837).
98. Id. at 536; see also HURST, supra note 43, at 37–38 (discussing the Charles River Bridge
case).
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the community also have rights; and that the happiness and well-being
of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.” 99
Furthermore, the Court’s jurisprudence surrounding the famous
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad case indicated that it
did not consider corporations to hold Fourteenth Amendment
protections coextensive with that of natural persons. In Northwestern
National Life Insurance Company v. Riggs, for example, the Court
explained that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was
“[t]he liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.” 100 In addition, just two
years after Santa Clara, the Court upheld a statute making railroads
liable for injuries to workers caused by the mismanagement or
negligence of other employees. 101 The Court acknowledged that
“corporations are persons within the meaning” of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but observed that when legislation imposes “additional
liabilities” on “particular bodies or associations,” it does not deny them
“the equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought under its
influence are treated alike under the same conditions.” 102 The
“hazardous character of the business of operating a railway would seem
to call for special legislation . . . having for its object the protection of
their employees as well as the safety of the public.” 103 The Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence at the time thus concerned
property protections, not liberty, for corporations, and the Court
subsequently applied the rulings so as to uphold regulation of
corporations by the government. 104
Finally, in the early years of the twentieth century, the Court
recognized corporate criminal liability and denied corporations the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Early common law
did not impose criminal responsibility on corporations as courts
struggled with the conceptual difficulty of attributing an act and intent
to a corporation. 105 By the early twentieth century, however, courts had
99. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 548.
100. 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906).
101. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888).
102. Id. at 209–10.
103. Id. at 210.
104. See id.; see also Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889)
(upholding a law mandating railroads that failed to erect fences along their right of ways to
reimburse farmers for livestock injured or killed by trains); Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R.
Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386 (1892) (upholding a law imposing a special tax on railroads to pay the
costs of the commission the state had created to regulate them).
105. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909) (citing
Chief Justice Holt and Blackstone and explaining that early common law held a corporation could
not commit a crime); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476 (“A corporation cannot commit
treason, or felony, or other crime, in it’s [sic] corporate capacity.”). For a more detailed history
of corporate criminal
liability
in
England
and
America,
see
Kathleen
F.
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taken a broader approach by importing tort and agency principles to
hold corporations vicariously liable for criminal acts performed by
corporate agents. 106 In addition, federal regulation of economic activity
through criminal statutes, such as antitrust laws, had grown by this
time and queued up issues concerning the government’s power to
prosecute corporations. 107 In 1909, in New York Central & Hudson
Railroad Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court definitively
recognized corporate criminal liability based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior. 108
Also around this time, the Court held in Hale v. Henkel that a
corporation had a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizure but could not assert a Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. 109 Pragmatism may have driven the decision
as granting corporations the privilege against self-incrimination could
have significantly impeded corporate criminal prosecutions that were
growing at the time, whereas recognizing corporations as holding some
right against unreasonable government searches and seizures would
not entirely shield corporations from such enforcement. 110
Although much had changed for corporations and their role in
society, the larger picture of these early twentieth-century cases was
one that generally fit the trend of the corporate rights jurisprudence
that had come before—the Court recognized limited rights that
reinforced the corporation against government interference with its
property, but did so while balancing considerations of the public
interest and rejecting more expansive corporate claims. In sum, the
nineteenth and early twentieth-century case law achieved a balance
that simultaneously strengthened the functional utility of the

Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q.
393, 396–400, 404–15 (1982).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 609 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); United
States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1898); see also Brickey, supra note 105, at 404–
15 (discussing history of corporate accountability in the United States).
107. Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV.
793, 814–16 (1996).
108. 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909).
109. 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (considering challenges by a corporate officer who had immunity as an
individual but refused to testify or comply with a grand jury subpoena for corporate records in
connection with a criminal antitrust investigation of the tobacco industry). The Court’s rationale
for denying corporations the privilege against incrimination was that it “is purely a personal
privilege of the witness,” and a corporation can testify only through agents. Id. at 69–70; see also
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (holding that the principal shareholder of a closely
held corporation could not assert privilege against self-incrimination in response to a subpoena for
corporate documents).
110. Henning, supra note 107, at 797.
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corporate form and legal personality while defusing the threat of
corporate sovereignty.
III. THE EXPANSION OF CORPORATE RIGHTS AND THE FORGOTTEN PATH
OF LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY
The foregoing discussion is aimed at highlighting the role that
constitutional protections related to corporations’ abilities to sue and be
sued, contract, and hold property played in bolstering similar functions
that were established as a matter of common law principles. Although
corporate law scholars rarely point to nineteenth and early twentiethcentury constitutional law as part of the foundational body of law
establishing key functions or characteristics for corporations, it has
played a profoundly important role in solidifying the utility of the
corporate form in the United States. 111 The corporate personhood
doctrine concerning the constitutional treatment of corporations added
dimension to basic features related to legal personality—for example,
contract protections for the corporation are not an ahistorical function
of legal personality but are embedded in the U.S. system of federalism.
Further, during this period of jurisprudence, in shaping notions of the
private sphere inhabited by corporations, the Court did much to defuse
their potential as rivals or competitors to the state and temper the
threat of corporations as imperium in imperio—a state within a state. 112
In this final part, I reflect on a critique that Margaret Blair and
I levied against the Court’s modern trend of corporate rights
jurisprudence in cases such as Citizens United v. FEC, and pursue a
related point. 113 Despite the significant benefits provided by the
nineteenth and early twentieth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence
on corporate rights that this Article has explored, this jurisprudence
came with a significant flaw that Professor Blair and I have earlier
identified: it lacked a consistent method of reasoning that adequately
evolved in its application over time as corporations changed. 114 As we
showed, the Court has long accorded rights to corporations based on the
rationale that corporations represent associations of people from whom
such rights are derived or on an instrumental basis to protect the rights
of parties outside the corporation. 115 By the late nineteenth century,
however, we argued that this associational view was already becoming

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Part II.A.
See Part II.B; Ablavsky, supra note 47, at 1816–19, 1848–51.
Blair & Pollman, supra note 6, at 1734.
Id. at 1708–31.
Id. at 1680–96, 1713–31.
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a poor fit for some corporations. 116 Where the Court has gone wrong in
recent case law such as Citizens United, we argued, was in ruling
broadly as to all corporations as “associations of citizens.” 117 We
observed that, if the Court were to continue to use this method of
reasoning, a more principled path forward requires the Court to
carefully determine whether there is a factual foundation to support an
extension of a right to the corporation at hand. 118 Difficult line-drawing
questions inevitably follow and the corporate rights case law would
improve by addressing these questions forthrightly and with committed
attention to real-world facts about the wide spectrum of corporations. 119
We did not focus on a related line of critique—that the Supreme
Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence since the nineteenth century has
dramatically expanded and revealed that the Court does not observe a
limiting principle to the doctrine of corporate personhood. All
corporations ultimately have natural persons involved in some
respect—even shell corporations are created by natural persons for
some objective that ultimately serves human ends. If a derivative
approach to corporate rights is taken without serious effort to
distinguish between the kinds of organizations that further the purpose
of the right at issue from those which do not, then it is meaningless as
a method of determining corporate rights.

116. Id. at 1707 (noting that by the end of the nineteenth century “changes in the population
of corporations were taking place that were at odds with the idea that business corporations were
just associations of people”).
117. Id. at 1734.
118. Id. at 1733 (“[T]he Court [must] pay attention to distinctions” and should “explicitly
acknowledge that, for some purposes, some corporations can usefully and functionally be regarded
as aggregates of their members from whom rights could be derived, while other corporations serve
other purposes, and cannot be regarded as representing any particular natural person or group of
natural persons.”).
119. John Dewey famously argued nearly a century ago for this approach. See John Dewey,
The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 (1926) (arguing for
questions of corporate personhood to be answered by facing the “concrete facts and relations
involved”). For a sampling of work exploring questions of line drawing and corporate rights, see
Margaret M. Blair, Corporations and Expressive Rights: How the Lines Should Be Drawn, 65
DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2016) (arguing that at least two dimensions should be important to the Court
in determining expressive rights for corporations: people and purpose); James D. Nelson, The
Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461 (2015) (exploring the for-profit/nonprofit
distinction as a basis for line drawing in corporate claims for freedom of association); James D.
Nelson, Facts and Values in Corporate Legal Theory, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE
PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD 240 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021) (exploring
a realist method for corporate rights determinations based on facts and values); Elizabeth
Pollman, Line Drawing in Corporate Rights Determinations, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 597, 602 (2016)
(arguing that “existing lines drawn between corporations” such as for-profit/nonprofit,
public/private, and closely held “may be a useful starting place for analysis, but caution must be
used because the lines drawn in other areas were done for various policy reasons in different
contexts that may not map onto the corporate rights determination”).
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Neither denying corporations all rights because they have
separate legal personality, nor granting all rights to all corporations
because they bear some connection to human interests, is a coherent
approach. Admittedly, from time to time, the Court has reasoned or
simply noted in passing that corporations are not entitled to “purely
personal guarantees” 120—but it has not consistently used this as a
limiting principle or fleshed out its content. 121 Instead, the Court has
tended to grant corporations’ claims for protections based on derivative
and instrumental rationales with little clarity on a means of analytical
line drawing. 122
Using this flawed approach, the Court’s expansion of corporate
rights has furthered the trends of increasing corporate influence over
the regulatory state and the rise of rival powers, subjects of concern
that had troubled early American jurists, lawmakers, and citizens.
Whereas the Court in the nineteenth century denied claims for
corporate rights on multiple occasions, this pattern shifted in the
twentieth century, particularly since the 1970s. 123 Although many
factors have contributed to increasing economic concentration and
corporate power in recent decades, the Court’s corporate political
spending jurisprudence has allowed corporations to use their money
and influence in a variety of ways that impact the very political and
regulatory environment in which they act. 124
120. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (holding corporations cannot claim a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because
the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of
individuals.”).
121. Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 50, 52–53 (2014)
(noting that the Court “has not consistently used this approach [of reasoning based on “purely
personal” guarantees] or shown that it would be possible to do so in the context of corporations”).
122. For example, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court determined that
a business corporation can constitute a “person” who can “exercise religion” under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). 573 U.S. 682, 719 (2014). Further, it concluded that
RFRA applied to the corporate litigants in the case claiming a religious exemption from providing
certain contraceptive coverage to their employees under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act. The Court’s extension of RFRA protection to business corporations to protect the
religious liberty of those who “own and control” the corporation did little to explain which corporate
participants count and the method for determining which corporations have taken sufficient steps
to demonstrate a religious purpose or identity—the Court seemingly just looked through the
corporations to their shareholders who asserted religious belief. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate
Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah
Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016).
123. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 6, at 1719–31 (discussing expansion of corporate rights
since 1970s).
124. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The
Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
335, 342 (2015) (arguing that Citizens United “undermines . . . reliance upon the regulatory
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Recent years have highlighted the perils of this dynamic. Some
of the world’s largest companies also appear to be some of the biggest
political spenders. We cannot accurately determine the precise contours
of corporate political spending because of the lack of transparency, 125
but we can observe, for example, that Facebook and Amazon were at
the top of the list in 2020 for federal lobbying expenditures. 126 These
companies, and others that bear resemblance in their size or social
footprint, are global behemoths that scholars have indeed likened
to “private governments,” 127 harkening back to concerns about
imperium in imperio and rivals to states that could erode
democratic governance. 128
And, finally, the Court’s failure to set out a limiting principle to
its derivative and instrumental approach looms large on the horizon as
the Court appears poised to hear claims for expanded speech and
religious liberty rights, as well as claims for rights previously denied to
business corporations, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and privacy rights. 129 It cannot be enough to simply
locate natural persons involved in the corporate claimants as a basis for
granting rights. For a derivative approach to have meaning, the facts
on the ground must be confronted, such as the nature of the
process as an adequate safeguard against corporate overreaching” because “the wealth impounded
in corporations can be used in unlimited amounts to influence who is elected to the offices that
determine the ‘rules of the game’ ”).
125. For a sampling of literature on the lack of transparency of corporate political spending,
see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending,
101 GEO. L.J. 923, 925 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., James D. Nelson &
Roberto Tallarita, The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1
(2020); Sarah Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public
Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 262 (2016) and Sarah Haan, Opaque Transparency: Outside Spending
and Disclosure by Privately-Held Business Entities, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149 (2014).
126. Ryan Tracy, Chad Day & Anthony DeBarros, Facebook and Amazon Boosted Lobbying
Spending in 2020, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-and-amazonboosted-lobbying-spending-in-2020-11611500400 [https://perma.cc/7NSP-AF9D].
127. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017) (describing employers as “private governments”
with sweeping power over workers’ lives); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules,
and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (describing how Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube moderate content and act as “new governors” of online expression).
128. See, e.g., Lina Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017)
(examining Amazon’s dominance in the internet economy); Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market
Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2014)
(examining how the exercise of power by large corporations functions as a form of private
governance); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 15 (2018)
(“Many fear Google, Amazon, and Facebook, and their power over not just commerce, but over
politics, the news, and our private information.”).
129. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Law Enforcement’s Lochner, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1667 (2021)
(exploring how constitutional developments and challenges on the horizon threaten to undermine
government’s enforcement power against corporations).
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participants’ relationships to the corporation, the corporation’s purpose
and its governance, among other considerations, in determining if it
serves the purpose of the right to extend it to a particular corporation. 130
As the Court continues to hear claims for rights beyond those incidental
to basic features of legal personality, these decisions hold the potential
to shape not only the continued utility of the corporate form but also
the role of corporations in society and the means by which we hold
them accountable.
CONCLUSION
For ages, distinguished corporate law scholars have attempted
to shed light on thorny issues of corporate personhood and legal
personality. Many able minds have been put in knots or distracted by
rhetoric. Professor Margaret Blair’s work on the key functions of legal
personality for corporations shines as an example of clarity on the
subject, highlighting elementary or core principles that have been borne
out through centuries of corporate use and development. This Article
has aimed to show that the Supreme Court’s nineteenth-century case
law on the treatment of corporations under the U.S. Constitution
paralleled in many ways the topics of these key functions and
strengthened the corporate form by shaping it as a rights-bearing entity
vis-à-vis the government. Notably, during this period of jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court simultaneously protected corporations but also
treated them as having a limited and derivative measure of sovereignty,
at best, that was subordinate to the state, and it reflected concern for
the interests of communities and the public at large. The balance of
power struck in the first century of jurisprudence on corporate rights
has been lost, however, as the Court failed to develop a consistent
method of reasoning that fit the evolving spectrum of corporations.
Instead, the Court’s tendency to grant rights on a derivative and
instrumental basis has revealed that it lacks a limiting principle—
when presented with a wide variety of corporations, it tends to see the
interests of natural persons.

130. See supra note 119.

